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The Third Branch of Liberty
JOHN PAUL STEVENS*

It is an honor to be invited to deliver the Second Robert B. Cole
Lecture. In the first lecture in this series, Chief Justice Burger made a
reference to the purposes of our Constitution, placing particular
emphasis on the purpose to "ensure domestic Tranquility."' My
comments tonight are inspired by the final purpose stated in the preamble to that wonderful document-to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."2
There are at least three reasons why it is appropriate to devote
this Cole Lecture to the concept of liberty. This is the year in which
we celebrate the 100th birthday of the Statue of Liberty. The enthusiasm that has accompanied that birthday celebration confirms my
assumption that Americans generally agree with the proposition that
liberty is indeed a blessing. Nevertheless, since all Americans do not
share the same understanding of the word liberty-at least as it is
used in our Constitution-a dialogue about liberty may serve a useful
purpose. Finally, because the audience that I most frequently address
does not always seem to be listening to what I have to say about liberty, I welcome the opportunity to repeat some of those comments to
a captive audience.
I.
The fifth and the fourteenth amendments to the Constitution
provide that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due pro* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Stevens delivered
this address at the second annual Robert B. Cole Lecture Series held at the University of
Miami School of Law on Thursday, November 20, 1986.
1. Burger, The High Cost of Prison Tuition, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903, 905 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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cess of law. 3 One conception of liberty that would be consistent with
the language of these amendments is that it simply refers to an individual's freedom to do what he pleases. That freedom is unlimited
except to the extent that the government, following its regular legislative procedures, enacts laws that curtail the zone of freedom, or, in
particular cases, following regular judicial procedures, determines
that specific individuals shall be subjected to more stringent deprivations of their liberty. Under this conception, as long as laws are made
by representatives of the majority, we can be confident that an ample
zone of freedom will be preserved because it is safe to assume that the
majority of Americans are lovers of freedom. Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of fair trial protects every American from the risk of
arbitrary imprisonment that characterizes despotic government.
Thus, even if we adopt the narrowest interpretation of the due process
clause-that it is nothing more than a guarantee of fair procedure-it
nevertheless plays a vital role in determining the character of our free
society.
During the course of our history, philosophers, statesmen, and
judges have suggested that the idea of liberty is more complex than
the simple notion of doing whatever one pleases and that even though
the plain language of the due process clause seems to speak only of
procedure, there are some deprivations of liberty that are impermissible regardless of the process that may accompany them.
Let me begin with a reference to a portion of Mortimer J. Adler's
explanation of why the great idea of liberty is not without its inner
complexity. He has concluded that there are at least three major
kinds of freedom: natural freedom, acquired freedom, and circumstantial freedom.
He described the first-the freedom that is inherent in human
nature-in this way:
Our natural freedom consists in freedom of the will. It is freedom of choice-the liberty of being able to choose otherwise than
as we did. Having such freedom, our actions are not instinctively
determined or completely conditioned by the impact of external
circumstances on our development, as is the case in the behavior of
other animals. With this innate power of free choice, each human
being is able to change his own character creatively by deciding for
himself what he shall do or shall become. We are free to make
3. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall .. .be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall ...deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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ourselves whatever we choose to be.4

Acquired liberty-which is sometimes called "moral freedom"-is the product of reasoned control of the passions. It is the
acquired disposition to make right rather than wrong choices. Thus,
in Adler's view, the possession of natural liberty distinguishes men
and women from other animals and acquired liberty is a characteristic
that distinguishes the virtuous man from other men. By nature we
are endowed with the freedom to decide whether or not to pay our
bills promptly. 6 But how we will exercise that freedom in a particular case may depend on the character of our acquired libertywhether we have acquired the habit of acting justly or unjustly in such
cases.
It may also depend on the third kind of freedom identified by
Mortimer Adler-circumstantial freedom. A person who is bankrupt
and disabled may not be able to discharge his debts even if he wants
to. As Adler explains, "Our circumstantial freedom consists in our
being able to do as we please-our ability to carry out in overt action
the decisions we have reached, to do as we wish for our individual
good as we see it, rightly or wrongly." 7 It is obvious that the scope of
the circumstantial freedom that is possessed by different individuals
can vary widely. Not all of us are free to dine at the Ritz whenever
we please.
After identifying the three major forms of liberty, Adler suggests
that just regulations are only concerned with the third-the circumstantial freedom to do as one pleases. There is no need for government to regulate natural liberty or acquired liberty. Moreover,
although the restraints that are imposed by government may impair
an individual's freedom of action, they do not impair his freedom of
choice or his moral liberty-"his freedom to will as he ought." 8 Circumstantial liberty may, however, be regulated by government since it
is obvious that what a particular individual may wish to do may be
injurious to someone else and may be contrary to the best interests of
the community.9
4. MORTIMER J. ADLER, Six GREAT IDEAS 141 (1981).
5. Id.
6. As Plato wrote, "Well said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?to speak the truth and to pay your debts-no more than this?" PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 8-9 (B.
Jowett trans. 1941).
7. MORTIMER J. ADLER, supra note 4, at 142.
8. Id. at 143.
9. Adler concluded that the word "license," rather than liberty, better describes "doing
as one pleases, when so doing is illegitimate, unlawful, or unjust." Id. Human beings who live
in an organized society are not entitled to unlimited liberty of action because unlimited liberty
is destructive of the society itself. When the distinction between license and liberty "is
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It is quite wrong, however, to assume that regulation and liberty
occupy mutually exclusive zones-that as one expands, the other
must contract.' 0 It is no doubt true that most laws create a risk that
the quantum of liberty will be diminished, but one of the inner complexities of the concept of liberty is that the application of coercive
governmental power may enlarge the sphere of liberty. The Sherman
Act, for example, has been aptly characterized as "a charter of freedom" I because it is designed to enlarge the opportunity for independent decision making by "each and every business, no matter how
small" ' 2 by prohibiting giant trusts and monopolies from controlling
the market. In a similar fashion, the constitutional provisions that
prohibit states and municipalities from regulating the content of public discourse serve to protect the individual's freedom to express himself. Indeed, some regulations that prohibit or constrain speech at
certain times and in certain places-such as procedural rules in a
courtroom or in a legislature, or Robert's Rules of Order in a private
understood and accepted, it follows that the individual who is prevented from doing what he
pleases by just restraints suffers no loss of liberty." Id. at 144.
As Aristotle said, the virtuous man does freely what the criminal does only from
fear of the law-fear of its coercive force and of the punishment that may result
from violating the law. The criminal, however, does not suffer any loss of liberty
when he refrains from breaking the law, for what he wishes to do, being unlawful
and just, is something he ought not to do anyway, even if he were not constrained
by law. His license to do as he wishes, not his liberty, has been taken away.
Id. at 147.
10. As Adler wrote:
The sphere of circumstantial liberty is not, as John Stuart Mill wrongly
supposed, the sphere of conduct unregulated by law, with the consequence, in
Mill's view, that the more our conduct is regulated by law, the less freedom we
have. Nor is it true, as Thomas Jefferson said, that the less government the
better, because the less government, the freer we are.
An earlier English philosopher, John Locke, provides us with a sounder
view of the matter. In the first place, much of our conduct is not and cannot be
regulated by law, no matter how massive such regulation may be. This is true
not only of the civil law, the positive law of the state, but also of the moral law;
for much of our conduct is morally indifferent, neither prescribed nor proscribed
by moral rules. In this area where, in Locke's words, "the law prescribes not,"
we are quite free to do as we please.
Id. at 146.
11. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933).
12. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic
freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection
of our fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and
every business, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete-to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can
muster.
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meeting-enable individuals to communicate effectively when their
voices might otherwise be drowned in a sea of noise and confusion.
Even traffic laws can be justified on the ground that they increase the
liberty of individual drivers to travel from place to place as they
please-to minimize the risk that a traffic jam will deprive a person of
his circumstantial freedom.
Although regulation and liberty are not incompatible with one
another, the latter is surely the greater blessing. As Adler concluded,
"The maximization of our circumstantial freedom to do as we please
is the great and real good conferred upon human beings by just laws,
effectively enforced."' 3
John Stuart Mill was also convinced that liberty is good. In his
classic essay On Liberty, written in 1859, he argued that "the only
unfailing and permanent source of improvement is liberty, since by it
there are as many possible independent centres of improvement as
there are individuals."' 4 He introduced his essay by raising a fundamental question which he believed not only exerted a profound influence on the practical controversies of his generation by its latent
presence, but was also "likely soon to make itself recognised as the
vital question of the future."' 5 His subject was "the nature and limits
of the power which can be legitimately exercised by society over the
individual."' 6
In Mill's opinion, the importance of that question does not
depend on the form of government by which a people may be ruled.
He rejected the argument that individual liberty is secure as long as
the rulers are elected by and identified with the people and their interests. This paragraph, written only a few years before the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment, conveys a profound message:
The notion, that the people have no need to limit their power over
themselves, might seem axiomatic, when popular government was
a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some
distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French
Revolution, the worst of which were the work of a usurping few,
and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of
popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak
against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however,
a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's
13. MORTIMER J. ADLER, supra note 4, at 147-48.
14. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS
62-63 (R. McCallum ed. 1946) (1859).
15. Id. at 1.
16. Id.

ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
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surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members
of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait
upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases
as "self-government," and "the power of the people over themselves," do not express the true state of the case. The "people"
who exercise the power are not always the same people with those
over whom it is exercised; and the "self-government" spoken of is
not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest.
The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the
most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority,
or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently may desire to oppress a part of their
number; and precautions are as much needed against this as
against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the
power of government over individuals loses none of its importance
when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. This view of things,
recommending itself equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to
the inclination of those important classes in European society to
whose real or supposed interests democracy is adverse, has had no
difficulty in establishing itself; and in political speculations "the
tyranny of the majority" is now generally included among the evils
against which society requires to be on its guard. 7
The central thesis of Mill's essay was that "the only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."' 8
Mill's central thesis has had a great impact on subsequent dialogues
about liberty, but I do not believe we can accept it without qualification. In fact, since Mill himself recognized the need for exceptions for
"young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or womanhood"' 19 and ultimately concluded that a man should
not be permitted to sell himself into slavery even if no one else would
be harmed, presumably he would agree that almost any bright line
rule must leave room for exceptional cases.20 His writing, like
17. Id. at 3-4.

18. Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Yet, in the laws, probably, of every country, this general rule has some
exceptions. Not only persons are not held to engagements which violate the

rights of third parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for
releasing them from an engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and
most other civilised countries, for example, an engagement by which a person
should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void;
neither enforced by law nor by opinion. The ground for thus limiting his power
of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, is apparent, and is very clearly seen
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Adler's, however, forcefully reminds us of the importance of asking
the basic question whether there is a principle that limits the power of
a democratically elected majority-or super majority-to constrain
the liberty of the individual citizen, and if so, what that principle is.
Because I have always been skeptical about the ability of any judge to
formulate a single satisfactory answer to questions of that kind, 21 I
shall merely describe two basic interests-in addition to the simple
interest in doing what one pleases-that may shed some light on the
inquiry.
II.
The first is the interest of the individual in staying out of jail.
That interest should not be confused with the interest in not living in
confined quarters subject to strict rules of discipline. Many free men
and women live in uncomfortable quarters. Even though the word
"liberty" is used to describe a sailor's temporary absence from the
routine of wartime service in the Navy, the deprivations that he
endures when he is not at liberty are fundamentally different from
those endured by the convicted criminal. Unlike the sailor, the prisoner's freedom to do as he pleases is constrained because he has been
found guilty of objectionable conduct. His narrow interest in staying
out of jail actually encompasses his interest in not being punished or
humiliated unjustly-in other words, the interest in not being treated
less favorably than the average member of society unless there is an
acceptable justification for such treatment. That interest is not
invaded when an individual volunteers for service in the Armed
Forces or is a member of a large class of similarly situated able bodied
persons all of whom are drafted into service. It is invaded, however, if
a person is branded as a "felon" without a hearing to determine
whether his conduct violated any rule that the majority has adopted
for its own governance. It is also invaded if he is treated less favorain this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others,
with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary
choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to

him, and his good is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his
own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his
liberty; he forgoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He therefore
defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the justification of allowing
him to dispose of himself. He is no longer free; but is thenceforth in a position

which has no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his
voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he

should be free not to be free.
Id. at 92.
21. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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bly than the majority of his peers simply because his skin is not of the
same color as theirs.
In 1955, the Supreme Court considered the question whether the
prohibition against the deprivation of "liberty" in the due process
clause of the fifth amendment imposes substantive, as well as procedural, constraints upon the federal government. The case of Boiling v.
Sharpe2 2 was one in which black children who had been refused
admission to a public school solely because of their race contended
that they had suffered an arbitrary deprivation of liberty. The Court's
unanimous holding was summarized in a single sentence: "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the
District of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary depriva23
tion of their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause.
The Court was equally forceful when it unanimously concluded
that the Virginia anti-miscegenation statute deprived Mildred and
Richard Loving of liberty without due process of law in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. It flatly stated,
"Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
'24
infringed by the State."
Thus the Court has made it perfectly clear that a burden on the
individual interest in equal respect and equal treatment may constitute an arbitrary deprivation of liberty without any inquiry into the
procedures that accompanied the deprivation. One of the elements of
liberty is the right to be respected as a human being.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court sometimes seems oblivious to
this simple proposition. For example, three Terms ago in the case of
Hudson v. Palmer,z5 the Court apparently concluded that prison
inmates have no constitutional protection against the malicious and
arbitrary seizure of their personal effects. In my dissent, I quoted
from an opinion that I had written for the court of appeals fifteen
years ago. I wrote:
[T]he view once held that an inmate is a mere slave is now totally
rejected. The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do not place the citizen beyond the ethical tradition
that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every
individual. "Liberty" and "custody" are not mutually exclusive
22. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
23. Id. at 500.

24. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
25. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
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concepts.26
Two Terms ago, in a relatively obscure case, Walters v. National
Association of Radiation Survivors,2 7 the Court sustained the constitu-

tionality of a statute that imposed a ceiling of $10 on the fee that a
lawyer could charge for services performed in connection with the
processing of a claim for veterans' benefits, thus effectively prohibiting
individual claimants from retaining private counsel. Because this prohibition was harmless in the vast majority of cases, the Court was not
moved by the argument that injustice could easily occur in individual
cases. According to the Court, process which was "sufficient for the
large majority of a group of claims is by constitutional definition sufficient for all of them."2 In dissent, I suggested that the Court's
majoritarian analysis did not recognize the true value of individual
liberty, and concluded with this paragraph:
In my view, regardless of the nature of the dispute between
the sovereign and the citizen-whether it be a criminal trial, a proceeding to terminate parental rights, a claim for social security
benefits, a dispute over welfare benefits, or a pension claim asserted
by the widow of a soldier who was killed on the battlefield-the
citizen's right to consult an independent lawyer and to retain that
lawyer to speak on his or her behalf is an aspect of liberty that is
priceless. It should not be bargained away on the notion that a
totalitarian appraisal of the mass of claims processed by the Veterans' Administration does not identify an especially high probability
of error.2 9

The importance of procedural safeguards-and the community's
confidence that individual liberty will not be denied without due process of law-is illustrated by the recent negotiations between the
Soviet Union and the United States that led each to surrender a person accused of espionage to the other. Our concern about the fate of
Daniloff reflected a lack of confidence in the integrity of the procedural safeguards available to him in a foreign tribunal, but conceivably the Soviets may have been influenced by the opposite concernthat a fair trial in an American court would bring out the truth.
The prolonged interrogation of Daniloff while he was being
detained by the Soviet police brings into sharp focus the decision last
Term in the case of Moran v. Burbine,3° in which the Court seems to
26. Id. at 557-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States ex. rel. Miller v. Twomey,
479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973)).
27. 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
28. Id. at 3194.

dissenting).
29. Id. at 3216 (Stevens, J.,
30. 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
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have held that an attorney has no right of access to a client who is
being held in custody until the police have had a fair opportunity to
conclude their incommunicado interrogation of the suspect. In my
dissent, I suggested that the case turned
on a proper appraisal of the role of the lawyer in our society. If a
lawyer is seen as a nettlesome obstacle to the pursuit of wrongdoers-as in an inquisitorial society-then the Court's decision today
makes a good deal of sense. If a lawyer is seen as an aid to the
understanding and protection of constitutional rights-as in an
accusatorial society-then today's decision makes no sense at all. 3'
Fortunately, most state courts-including one that recently
reviewed the reasoning in the majority opinion in Burbine32 - place a
higher value on individual liberty than is reflected in the Burbine
holding.
III.

Let me turn to the title of my talk-The ThirdBranch of Liberty.
You will recall that the subject of John Stuart Mill's essay was "the
nature and limits of the power which can belegitimately exercised by
society over the individual. ' 33 Necessarily that statement assumes
that there is more than a procedural limitation on the exercise of such
power. The same assumption must undergird a number of decisions
of the United States Supreme Court that have invalidated laws duly
enacted by representatives of the majority. Some of those decisions
have expressly relied on the Court's concept of liberty; others, perhaps motivated by a misguided fear of the ghost of Lochner v. New
York,34 have articulated other rationales but may actually have rested
on the Court's understanding of liberty.35
31. Id. at 1166 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, - Cal. Rptr. -, 724 P.2d 1166 (1986).
33. J.S. MILL, supra note 14, at 1.
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review. Haunted by
the Ghost of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 351 (1986).
35. If the original legitimacy of substantive due process was questionable, it was not
in philosophy a foreign transplant into our Eighteenth Century Constitution, for
it had flourished for halfa century and had never been wholly discarded. Indeed,
all of our recent constitutional history would have been more coherent, and more
satisfying to the Justices and to the various consumers of their constitutional
product, had the Supreme Court never abandoned substantive due process but
had merely excised its laissez-faire excrescence. Substantive due process would
have continued to mean that individual liberty is primary, that government has
to prove itself, but the fact that a regulation contributes to economic and social
advancement is proof enough, for that is clearly a proper, and now indeed

primary, purpose of government. Substantive due process without laissez-faire
would have made it possible to avoid automatic uncritical deference to
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The best known case that relied entirely on the concept of liberty
as the basis for decision is Meyer v. Nebraska,3 6 decided in 1923. In
that case the Court reversed the criminal conviction of an instructor
in a parochial school who had violated a Nebraska statute by teaching
the subject of reading in the German language to a ten-year-old child.
The Court held that the statute arbitrarily interfered "with the calling
of modem language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to
acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own."' 37 After quoting the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court stated:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things have been definitely stated.
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally
as essento enjoy those privileges long recognized at common3 law
8
tial to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
That definition of liberty may be broader than the Court would
adopt today-particularly because of its reference to the right of the
individual to contract-but the central holding of the Meyer case has
never been questioned. Indeed it was expressly endorsed in Moore v.
City of East Cleveland.39 As Justice Powell wrote:
A host of cases, tracing their lineage to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510, 534-535 (1925), have consistently acknowledged a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 40
During the past four decades-the period subsequent to the
rejection of the line of economic due process cases that are associated
with Lochner-the Court has decided a number of cases on grounds
government, as with respect to economic legislation, and subject
accommodations of private right to public good to bona-fide balancing.
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1427-28 (1974).
36. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

all

37. Id. at 401.
38. Id. at 399.
39. 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (Powell, J.); see also id. at 536 (Stewart, Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting) ("As I have said, Meyer has not been overruled
nor its definition of liberty rejected. The results reached in some of the cases cited by Meyer
have been discarded or undermined by later cases, but those cases did not cut back the
definition of liberty espoused by earlier decisions.").
40. Id. at 499.
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that have not always been entirely clear but which in retrospect may
well be explained by reference to the concept of liberty. Thus, in
4 1 the Court relied on the commerce
1941, in Edwards v. California,
clause to invalidate a state statute that interfered with an individual's
right to travel.4 2 But Justice Douglas protested "that the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more protected
position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across state lines."' 43 While Justice Douglas
reasoned that the right to move freely from state to state is an incident
of national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities
clause, he also considered it appropriate to quote Chief Justice
Fuller's statement in Williams v. Fears:'
Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one
place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or
through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution.45
Later in the same Term, in Skinner v. Oklahoma,4 6 the Court
invalidated an Oklahoma statute that authorized the sterilization of
"habitual criminals." The Court's opinion rested on equal protection
grounds. Chief Justice Stone's concurring opinion relied on a procedural due process theory that would have required the state to justify
the statutory invasion of personal liberty in every case in which the
statute was applied.4 7 Justice Jackson agreed with both the Court and
41. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
42. Almost three decades after the Edwards decision, the Court told us that it had "no
occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional
provision." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969).
43. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
45. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 179 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179
U.S. 270, 274 (1900)).
46. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
47. Id. at 543. Chief Justice Stone wrote:
And so I think the real question we have to consider is not one of equal
protection, but whether the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an
invasion of personal liberty, without opportunity to any individual to show that
his is not the type of case which would justify resort to it, satisfies the demands of
due process.
There are limits to the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality
can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person is concerned (see United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n.4) and where the
presumptions resorted to only to dispense with a procedure which the ordinary
dictates of prudence would seem to demand for the protection of the individual
from arbitrary action. Although petitioner here was given a hearing to ascertain
whether sterilization would be detrimental to his health, he was given none to
discover whether his criminal tendencies are of an inheritable type.
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the Chief Justice, but then added this telling sentence: "There are
limits to the extent to which a legislatively represented majority may
conduct biological experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minority-even those who have been
guilty of what the majority defines as crimes. "48
In Stanley v. Georgia,49 the Court held "that the mere private
possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally be made a
crime." 5 0 Although the Court assumed that the state could prohibit
the sale and distribution of Stanley's motion picture films, it grounded
its holding on the first amendment. It reasoned:
Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating
obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole
constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government
the power to control men's minds.
And yet, in the face of these traditional notions of individual
to protect the individual's mind
liberty, Georgia asserts the right
51
from the effects of obscenity."
In Stanley, as well as in later cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 3 the Court did not expressly rest its
holding on the due process clause, but the character of the interest
invaded by the state action in those cases prompted me to summarize
them this way in an opinion that I wrote for the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit in 1975:
These cases . . . deal, rather, with the individual's right to make
certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or
his family's, destiny. The Court has referred to such decisions as
implicating "basic values," as being "fundamental," and as being
dignified by history and tradition. The character of the Court's
language in these cases brings to mind the origins of the American
heritage of freedom-the abiding interest in individual liberty that
makes certain state intrusions on the citizen's right to decide how
he will live his own life intolerable. Guided by history, our tradition of respect for the dignity of individual choice in matters of
conscience and the restraints implicit in the federal system, federal
2

Id. at 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring).
48. Id. at 546.

49. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
50. Id. at 559.
51. Id. at 565.
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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judges have accepted the responsibility for
recognition and protec54
tion of these rights in appropriate cases.
It is often argued that the judges who decided those cases
accepted a responsibility that the Framers of the Constitution did not
intend to delegate to them. Justice Brandeis was referring to such
arguments when he included this comment in his concurring opinion
in Whitney v. California:"
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me
persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as
to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental rights comprised
within the term liberty are protected
by the Federal Constitution
56
from invasion by the States.
In view of the number of cases that have given substantive content to
the term liberty, the burden of demonstrating that this consistent
course of decision was unfaithful to the intent of the Framers is surely
a heavy one. In an article about Justice Brandeis, Paul Freund made
this observation:
It is always dangerous, of course, to project the ideas of a thinker
of another day into the specific controversies of our time. If it is
asked what Jefferson would think about this or that law of the
1950's, it is not altogether unfair to answer that if Jefferson were
57
alive today he would be too old to think clearly about anything.
The leaders of the American Bar in the eighteenth century were
practitioners and students of the common law. 8 They were familiar
with the process of developing new rules of law through the case-bycase adjudication of concrete disputes between adversary litigants. It
was this Anglo-American tradition rather than any elaborate and
detailed set of rules such as may be found in the Napoleonic Code,
that provided the backdrop for the drafting of the Constitution. As I
54. Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hosp., 523 F.2d 716, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1975). In
Fitzgerald, a father who had been trained in the LaMaze birth method asserted a constitutional
right to be present during the birth of his child. The majority of the panel rejected the claim.
Id. at 722.
55. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
56. Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
57. P. FREUND, Mr. Justice Brandeis, in MR. JUSTICE 113 (A. Dunham & P. Kurland ed.

1956).
58. A plaque at Jamestown, Virginia commemorating the introduction of the common law

into America, states in part:
Since Magna Carta the Common Law has been the cornerstone of individual

liberties, even as against the Crown, summarized later in the Bill of Rights its
principles have inspired the development of our system of freedom under law,
which is at once our dearest possession and proudest achievement.

A.E.

DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE

23 (1968).
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have previously suggested "the vast open spaces in the text of that
mysterious document" indicate that its authors "implicitly delegated
the power to fill those spaces to future generations of lawmakers." 9
The task of giving concrete meaning to the term "liberty", like the
task of defining other concepts such as "commerce among the States,"
"due process of law", and "unreasonable searches and seizures" was
apart of the work assigned to future generations of judges.6 °
The characteristics of the Third Branch of our Government also
provide important evidence concerning the probable intent of the
Framers with respect to the resolution of claims that an over-reaching
majority has arbitrarily infringed on individual liberty. The fact that
federal judges are selected through a majoritarian process provides a
reasonable assurance that they will understand and sympathize with
the reasons that support the Government's position in particular
cases. But the decision to provide article III judges with life tenure
and protection against the diminishment of their compensation during
their continuance in office makes it perfectly clear that the authors of
article III expected them to make unpopular decisions from time to
time.6 1 If there is to be an impartial arbitrator in controversies
59. Stevens, JudicialRestraint, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 451 n.35 (1985). As our Chief
Justice has written:
The framers of the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to
succeeding generations the task of applying that language to the unceasingly
changing environment in which they would live. Those who framed, adopted,
and ratified the Civil War amendments to the Constitution likewise used what
have been aptly described as "majestic generalities" in composing the fourteenth
amendment. Merely because a particular activity may not have existed when the
Constitution was adopted, or because the framers could not have conceived of a
particular method of transacting affairs, cannot mean that general language in
the Constitution may not be applied to such a course of conduct. When the
framers of the Constitution have used general language, they have given latitude
to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen.
Rehnquist, The Notion of A Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 694 (1976).
60. As James Madison wrote in 1819:
It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding
terms and phrases necessarily used in such a charter.., and that it might require
a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them.
Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 941 n.292
(1985) (quoting Letter From James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted
in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (Philadelphia 1865)).
61. If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a
strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will
contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be
essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
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between the individual and the sovereign, the members of the Third
Branch are surely the best qualified to accept that responsibility.
The last bit of evidence about the intent of the Framers that I
shall mention concerns the source of liberty that is protected by the
Constitution. Even if the concept of liberty includes nothing more
than the right to be free of bodily restraint-and does not encompass
any matter such as the right to decide where and with whom a person
may live-it would still be fundamentally wrong to assume that liberty is nothing more than a privilege or immunity that the majority
has granted to the individual and that may be withdrawn or contracted whenever the majority so wills. I made this62 point ten years
ago in my dissenting opinion in Meachum v. Fano:
The Court's holding today, however, appears to rest on a conception of "liberty" which I consider fundamentally incorrect.
The Court indicates that a "liberty interest" may have either
of two sources. According to the Court, a liberty interest may
"originate in the Constitution," or it may have "its roots in state
law." Apart from those two possible origins, the Court is unable to
find that a person has a constitutionally protected interest in
liberty.

If man were a creature of the State, the analysis would be correct. But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States
create the liberty which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are limitations on the power of the
sta,
sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The relevant
laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of
the citizen who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is
essential to the exercise and enjoyment of individual liberty in a
complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, and surely not
the exclusive source.
I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by
their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal unalienable rights.
It is that basic freedom which the Due Process Clause protects,
rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific
laws or regulations.6"
I am still convinced that this is the view of the men who declared in
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors
which the arts of designing men or the influence of particular conjunctures

sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a
tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government
and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (P. Ford ed. 1898).
62. 427 U.S. 215 (1975).
63. Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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1776 that liberty was an unalienable right, the view of Abraham Lincoln when he stated that our Nation "was conceived in Liberty,"'
and the view of Justice Brandeis when he wrote these words:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be
the secret of happiness and courage to
65
be the secret of liberty.",

64. A. Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg (Nov.
19, 1863) in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: His SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (R. Basler ed. 1969).
65. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

